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Short term momentum: Role of investor sentiment in return formation 
Yuqing Sha 
 
Using transaction level data spanning across eighteen years over 1993 to 2010, we 
show that heavily bought stocks or heavily sold stocks display persistence in buy and 
sell order respectively. We show that over one trading day horizon, the persistence is 
strong enough to generate economically significant return. CAPM market factor, 
Fama-French Size and Book to Market factors, as well as Carhart’s momentum factor 
do not explain these results. However, the returns can be at least partially explained 
by investor sentiment variables and macroeconomic condition variables such as term 
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This paper attempts to explore the existence of short-term momentum in daily 
buying and selling pressure and its implications for daily stock returns. Our analysis is 
based on approx. 38 billion pairs of matched trades and quotes, spreading across all 
stocks in the CRSP database and spanning across eighteen years (January 1993 to 
December 2010). In the first part of this study, we identify the portfolio of most 
heavily bought stocks in the market on a given day and the portfolio of most heavily 
sold stocks in the market. We look for persistence in buying and selling pressures for 
these portfolios and explore the resulting short-term momentum in prices. In the 
second part of the study we examine the role of sentiment in the formation of the 
portfolio’s return. 
Our investigation is motivated by the behavioral theory of price dynamics, 
proposed by Shiller (1984) and Shleifer and Summers (1990). According to this 
theory, the dynamic interplay between noise traders and rational arbitrageurs 
establishes prices. According to this view, returns are not only dependent on changes 
in fundamentals, but could also be affected by other factors such as persistence in 
buying and selling by uninformed traders. 
Design of our investigation is motivated by the findings of two papers: First, 
Barber and Odean (2008), where they find that individual investors are net buyers of 
attention-grabbing stocks, e.g., stocks in the news, stocks experiencing high abnormal 
trading volume, and stocks with extreme one-day returns. We conjecture that most 
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small investors will see these attention-grabbing stocks at the end of the day and act 
on it in the following day. The second paper, which plays a key role in motivating our 
design, is Chorida and Subrahmanyam (2004). This paper presents evidence of 
positive autocorrelation in daily order imbalances. This suggests that an excess of 
buyer or seller initiated trade for a particular security on any given day is likely to be 
followed by excess of buyer or seller initiated trade (respectively) in that security the  
next day. 
Our study builds on the findings of Kumar and Lee (2006). They find that 
retail investor’s trades are systematically correlated. They further argue that the 
correlation is a result to trading habits of retail investors, whereby these traders buy or 
sell stocks in concert with each other. By highlighting sentiment based trading among 
retail investors, the authors find evidence in support of the role of investor sentiment 
in the formation of returns. We add to their findings in at least two ways. First: We 
show that the correlated trading effect is strong enough to affect the entire market and 
it might not be necessarily limited to retail trading. Secondly, our study spans across 
eighteen years time horizon covering expansion, recession and normal phases of the 
market. Our results throw new light on the role of investor sentiment in return 
formation in various phases of the business cycle.  
This paper reports the results from two stages of analysis. First, at the close of 
market, we identify 10% of the stocks with highest buy pressure (BUY portfolio) and 
10% of the stocks with highest sell pressure (SELL portfolio) during that trading day. 
Simple autocorrelation analysis finds that both portfolios demonstrate strong 
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momentum. This result is in concurrence with the findings of Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (2004), whereby stocks in the BUY portfolio continue to attract 
buyer-initiated trade and the stocks in the SELL portfolio continue to attract 
seller-initiated trade in the following day. We develop a short-term naïve trading 
strategy whereby, at the opening of the following day market, the investor takes long 
position in the BUY portfolio and a simultaneous short position in the SELL portfolio. 
He holds this position for the full trading day and exits the market with zero position 
at market close. In each of the eighteen years in the sample, the strategy earns positive 
returns ranging from 18.22% in 2007 to 119.11% in 1996. Moreover, controlling for 
market, size, book to market ratio, and momentum factors does not subsume these 
returns. 
These results are informative. They show that strong momentum exists at very 
short investment horizons. More importantly, the evidence shows that this short 
horizon momentum cannot be attributed solely to the established Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) momentum.
1
 These results imply one of the two things: either the 
short horizon momentum documented here, cannot be explained by factors such as 
short-term under-reaction, which are responsible for the JTM, or there must be 
multiple sources of momentum in returns which work differentially at differing time 
horizons. 
The second set of tests focuses on exploring the systematic vs. idiosyncratic 
nature of the factor responsible for the short horizon momentum documented in this 
                                                             
1 Hereafter we will refer to the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum as JTM. 
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study. We construct a daily BUY minus SELL (BMS) portfolio by taking a long 
position in the BUY portfolio and a simultaneous short position in the SELL portfolio. 
The return from this long and short position constitutes the BMS factor. Following 
Fama and French (1993), we construct a five-factor model (Market, Size, book to 
market ratio, momentum, and BMS). We estimate this model by year, across various 
size and industry portfolios. We find that the BMS factor marginally improves the 
explanatory power of the pricing model. The factor loading is found to be generally 
positive for large stocks and negative for small stocks. This result suggests that on 
average investors tend to be more on the buy side for large stocks and on the sell side 
for small stocks.  
A close examination of the results reveal that the loadings are significantly 
positive for large-size portfolios in the bull market (1994 to 1999) and during a bear 
market (2005 to 2008), the factor loading is significantly negative for small-size 
portfolios. One interpretation of this could be that in an expansionary period people 
tend to buy large-cap stocks while in recession, investors tend to sell more of 
small-cap stocks. Overall, the results seem to suggest that there might be a systematic 
factor explaining (at least partially) the observed short-term momentum. We also find 
that the BMS factor is negatively related to business cycle and positively related to 
investor sentiment (as measured by Baker and Wurgler, 2007). Overall, the evidence 
suggests that to a large extent, investor sentiment in the market is responsible for the 
observed short-term momentum. The magnitude of the daily returns (average 26 basis 
points) from the BUY-SELL positions suggests that at least large investors should be 
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able to capitalize from this strategy. Its persistence throughout the studied eighteen 
years time period poses a challenge to the weak form of market efficiency. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1 briefly reviews 
the related literature. Section 2 describes the data and summary statistics and presents 
our test methodology. Sections 3 discuss our empirical results, and Section 4 
concludes our paper. 
1. Background 
Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) show that past winners continue to outperform 
past losers over horizons of three to twelve months. The momentum trading strategy 
is a simple buy and hold strategy which requires the investor to buy stocks with high 
returns over the preceding three to twelve months and simultaneously sell stocks with 
poor returns over the same past horizons. For Example, a zero-cost portfolio that is 
long the past six-month winners (stocks whose past six-month returns rank among the 
best performing 10% stocks) and short the past six-month losers (stocks whose past 
six-month returns rank among the worst performing 10% stocks) generates an excess 
return of about 12% per annum from 1965 to 1989. Their findings lend support to the 
relative strength strategies such as the one discussed in Levy (1967): a trading rule 
that buys stocks with current prices that are substantially higher than their average 
prices over the past 27 weeks, realize significant abnormal returns.  
The momentum profitability does not seem to be market specific. For example 
Rouwenhorst (1998) find that momentum profits are also significant across various 
European markets. Chui, Titman and Wei (2000) document that with the exception of 
 6 
Japan and Korea, momentum strategies work in Asian markets. Similarly Griffin, Ji, 
and Martin (2005) find support for the economically and statistically significant 
momentum profit around the world. In a follow-up work to their 1993 paper, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) document that unlike various other anomalies (such as 
size effect and book-to-market effect), which disappeared after being reported, 
momentum profit has persisted throughout the 1990s. A word of caution is warranted 
at this stage, whereby; the documented profitability of the momentum strategy should 
not be mistakenly interpreted as evidence of arbitrage. Grundy and Martin (2001) 
show that over the 828 months between 1926 and 1995, the return momentum 
strategy earns a negative return in 322 of 828 months. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
also report that from 1965 to 1989 momentum strategy loses about 7% on average in 
the month of January. 
As discussed above, the extant literature provides substantial domestic and 
international evidence in support of the long-horizon momentum (six month to one 
year). However, in contrast to this, the evidence of short-horizon momentum is 
relatively scant. Pan, Liano, and Huang (2004) first document momentum in weekly 
industry portfolio returns，while Lehmann (1990) and Jegadeesh (1990) find reversals 
in individual stock returns of one week to one month. More recently, Gutierrez and 
Kelley (2008) find that “an opposing and long-lasting continuation in returns follows 
the well-documented brief reversal” (p415), and that the momentum in individual 
stock returns is not simply a manifestation of the long-horizon momentum. 
This study examines a very short horizon relative strength type strategy (one 
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day holding period), which may be classified (in terms of the style) as a variant of the 
momentum trading strategy. We examine a buy and hold strategy, which requires the 
investor to buy stocks with high buy pressure (stocks with highest 10% buyer initiated 
fractional trading volume) on the previous trading day, and simultaneously sell stocks 
with high sell pressure (stocks with highest 10% seller initiated fractional trading 
volume) on the previous trading day. The investor takes position at market open and 
exits the market with zero position at market close. The trading strategy is based on 
the conjectures that the dominant buy/sell pressures experienced by a given stocks on 
the previous day are likely to be persistent through the next day. To the extent that 
dominant buy pressure would lead to price increase and similarly, dominant sell 
pressure would lead to price decrease, the trading strategy should earn (on average) a 
positive return.  
Persistence in buy or sell pressure can arise due to either rational or irrational 
factors. From a rational perspective, strategic trading by informed traders can 
potentially give rise to persistence in order-imbalance. According to Chordia & 
Subrahmanyam (2004), traders are inclined to split their orders over time to minimize 
the price impact of trades, thus causing positive autocorrelation in order imbalances. 
In turn, this autocorrelation causes correlation in price pressures, which potentially 
gives, rise to a positive autocorrelation in returns. Kumar and Lee (2006) in their 
study on retail investor sentiment and return comovement find that when one group of 
retail investor buys (sells) stocks, another group of retail investors also buys (sells) 
stocks. This correlated trading causes persistence in volume of buyer-initiated trades 
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or volume of seller-initiated trades. In a Barclay and Warner (1993) type investigation 
of order size and price impact, Yang (2009) show that in the period before quarterly 
announcements, informed traders change their trading preference over time. His 
results show that in the pre-announcement period (from day -10 to day -6), informed 
traders use small orders to trade stealthily. Within five days before the announcements, 
they trade more aggressively to use increasingly large orders because they expect their 
information advantage to disappear after the announcements. 
From the irrational perspective, uninformed traders are likely to be swayed by 
prevailing sentiments in the market. When they believe the market is bullish on a 
given stock, they are likely to continue buying that stock, thus driving its prices up. In 
contrast, when the popular outlook is perceived to be pessimistic about a given stock, 
these investors will sell that stock thus driving its prices down. De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldmann (1990) study the effect of noise traders’ activities on stock 
prices and returns. They argue that when noise traders are pessimistic about an asset, 
they would drive down the asset’s prices and in the near future, they might become 
even more pessimistic and drive down the prices further. Conversely, when investors 
are optimistic, they might buy stocks and drive asset prices up. Lee, Jiang and Indro 
(2002) argue that bullish (bearish) shifts in sentiment lead to higher (lower) future 
excess returns. They find that noise traders increase their holdings of an asset when 
their sentiment becomes more bullish and conversely sell more stocks when they 
believe the market is bearish. This “hold-more” effect is likely to cause a short-term 
positive autocorrelation in stock returns. 
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2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Data 
This study involves several different types of data sets. The primary data for 
our study consist of the intraday trades from TAQ and daily stock files from Center 
for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). Our sample period spans from January 1st 
1993 to December 31st 2010 (for a total of 18 years). This span includes all phases of 
the market cycle ranging from the booming technology bubble in the mid to late 90s, 
its crash in 2000 and then the recessionary years post 2006. Our sample consists of the 
entire universe of stocks for which CRSP and TAQ contains the market data. We start 
our analysis with a sample size of 34,793,186 stock days (spread across 18 years). 
Since our trading strategy involves fractional buyer and seller-initiated trade, illiquid 
stocks could bias the results. To get around this problem, we delete all stocks below 
the lowest 20 percentile (by trading volume) in each trading year. The final sample 
consists of 22,475,317 stock days worth of data. The sample distribution by year is 
presented in Table I. 
The opening prices, closing prices, numbers of shares outstanding, and returns 
for our sample are obtained from the CRSP database. We obtain transaction level 
trade and quote data from the TAQ database. Following Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2001), several filters were employed to ensure the validity of the 
TAQ data.
2
 The TAQ database does not eliminate auto-quotes (passive quotes by 
                                                             
2
 We drop all trades with a correction indicator other than 0 or 1, and retain only those trades for 
which the condition is B, J, K, or S. We also drop all trades with non-positive trade size or price. 
Finally, we omit all trades recorded before opening time or after the closing time of the market. 
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secondary market dealers), which may cause the quoted spread to be artificially 
inflated. Since no reliable method can exclude auto-quotes in TAQ, only BBO (best 
bid or offer) eligible primary market (NYSE) quotes were used (Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam 2001, 2002).   
The daily Fama-French three factors, the momentum factor and the twelve 
industry portfolios definitions are obtained from Professor Kenneth R. French’s data 
library.
3
 The monthly investor sentiment index used in our study comes from Baker 
and Wurgler (2007)’s paper, and the data is available from Jeffrey Wurgler’s website 
at Stern, NYU.
4
 The business cycle indicator is obtained from Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis’ FRED database. The treasury 10-year interest rates, treasury 3-month 
interest rates and the Moody’s AAA corporate bond yields (which are used to 
calculate default spread and term spread) are obtained from Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS) ‘Federal Reserve Bank Reports’ dataset. 
2.2. Methodology 
We follow the Lee and Ready (1991) procedure for merging trade and quote 
data and classifying trades. According to this algorithm, a trade is classified as buyer- 
(seller-) initiated if the transaction price is closer to the ask (bid) price of the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Negative bid-ask spreads and transaction prices are also eliminated. In addition, only quotes that 
satisfy the following filter conditions are retained: we eliminate all quotes for which the quoted 
spread is greater than 20% of the quote midpoint, when the quote midpoint is greater than $10 or 
when the quoted spread is greater than $2, when the quote midpoint is less than $10. We also 
eliminate all quotes for which either the ask or the bid moves by more than 50%. All quotes with 







prevailing quote. The quote must be at least one second old. If the trade is at the exact 
midpoint of the quote, a “tick test” classifies the trade as buyer- (seller-) initiated if 
the last price change prior to the trade is positive (negative). Since the trade direction 
is inferred from the available information and not observed, some assignment error is 
inevitable. Hence, the resulting order-flow data is an estimate. Nevertheless, as shown 
by Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) and Odders-White (2000), the Lee and Ready 
(1991)’s algorithm is largely accurate; thus, inferences based on the estimated 
order-flow should be reliable.
5
 After merging and signing, the rest of our analysis is 
based on 37,227,391,369 pairs of trades and quotes. The annual distribution is 
presented in Table I. 
We count the total number of buyer-initiated trades and seller-initiated trades 
for each stock each day and then calculate the percentage of buyer-initiated trades as 
the total number of buyer-initiated trades divided by the total number of trades. Decile 
portfolios are constructed on the basis of the fractional buy volume.
6
 
At the end of each trading day, we rank the sample stocks by the fraction of 
buyer-initiated trade in each stock on that day. Using this ranking, we split the sample 
into decile portfolios. Thus, a stock gets assigned to portfolio 1 on any given day if it 
ranks among the top 10% stocks in terms of fraction of buyer initiated trade in that 
stock on that day. Stocks ranking among the 81st to 90th percentile form portfolio 2 
                                                             
5
 As robustness, we classify all the trades into buyer or seller initiated using only the tick-test. It does 
not qualitatively affect the results. 
6
 As test of robustness, we construct portfolios using fractional buyer initiated trading volume instead 
of the fractional number of buyer-initiated trade. The results remain qualitatively similar. For sake of 
brevity, we present only results obtained using the fractional number of buy trade decile portfolios. 
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and those falling among the 71st to 80th percentile form portfolio 3. We classify the 
portfolio of stocks falling among 21st to 30th percentile buy stocks as portfolio 4 and 
those in 11th to 20th percentile as portfolio 5. The lowest 10% of buy stocks are 
classified as portfolio 6. In other words, a stock gets assigned to portfolio 6 if it ranks 
among the top 10% stocks in terms of fraction of seller initiated trade in that stock on 
that day. The construction of our portfolios is based on the hypothesis of persistence 
in buys and sells. Therefore we only focus on the stocks ranking among the top three 
and bottom three deciles.  
2.2.1. Autocorrelation in Stock Returns 
The first set of tests focus on the autocorrelation patterns in returns of the 
stocks constituting the six portfolios formed above. Intuitively, a positive 
autocorrelation in stock returns would suggest that its own past high return predicts its 
future high return and similarly negative past return predicts negative future returns. 
Extant literature attributes daily return autocorrelation to three main sources. First: 
spurious autocorrelation caused by the use of stale prices (SA), second: 
autocorrelation caused by bid-ask bounce (BA), and third: autocorrelation arising due 
to partial price adjustment (PA). Often a fourth source in the form of time varying risk 
premia is also cited as a possible source of positive autocorrelation (RA). However, 
Anderson (2011) shows that the RA effect is sufficiently small and in the daily setting 
it can be safely ignored. 
Atchison, Butler and Simonds (1987), Lo and MacKinlay (1990) find that SA 
explains a very small part of total autocorrelation in portfolio returns. In a more recent 
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study Bernhardt and Davis (2008) find that the impact of SA on portfolio return 
autocorrelation is negligible. We use a very large sample in this study, ranging across 
eighteen years. Spurious correlation is unlikely to be the variable consistently driving 
our results across all days/years. We ignore this effect in this study. We address the 
bid-ask bounce related autocorrelation (BA) concern by running our analysis 
separately using two types of returns: first, daily return calculated by using daily 
opening to closing prices, and second: daily return calculated by using daily opening 
to closing bid-ask midpoint. 
The intuition of our study is based on expectation of persistence in buying and 
selling pressure across stocks. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1: On average the stocks across each of the six portfolios should display 
significant positive autocorrelation.  
Hypothesis 2: The autocorrelation in daily returns should be strongest for portfolios 1 
and 6, and display monotonic decline from 1 to 3 and from 6 to 4. 
We estimate the autocorrelation of returns for each stock each day by using a 
simple first-order autoregressive model
7
: 
    Rt,i = α +  βRt−1,i+ εt                       (1) 
Where Rt,i is stock i’s return on day t and Rt−1,i is stock i’s return on its previous 
day. Autocorrelation is measured by the coefficient  β. We expect β to be positive on 
average. The magnitude of β  is expected to be highest for stocks comprising 
portfolio 1 and 6. The magnitude is expected to decline from portfolio 1 to 3 and also 
                                                             
7 The choice of AR(1) model is driving by the data whereby we checked for existence of up to 10 lag 
correlation, and found AR(1)should be the best fit. 
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from portfolio 6 to 4. 
2.2.2. BUY and SELL Portfolio Returns 
The second set of tests focus on constructing the 6 portfolios based on 
differing buy and sell pressures and estimating their returns over 1 day holding period. 
The strategy calls for, first: we identify the six portfolios after market close on day 
(t-1). Second: in the morning of day (t), we take a long position in the buy dominant 
portfolio and simultaneous short position in the corresponding sell dominant portfolio. 
For example, long portfolio 1, short portfolio 6. Third: we close our position at market 
close on day (t). Thus, in terms of the 1-6 example, we sell our long position in 
portfolio 1 and close the short position in portfolio 6. The portfolio return is 
calculated as the open to close return on day (t). We have used equally weighted 
portfolio returns for this part of the analysis. We repeat the buy-hold-sell strategy 
every day for 4,535 trading days spanning across 18 years from January 1993 to 
December 2010. 
Hypothesis 3: Portfolios 1, 2 and 3 are expected to yield positive returns, while 
portfolios 4, 5 and 6 are expected to earn negative returns.  
Hypothesis 4: Since the buying pressure declines from portfolio 1 to portfolio 3 and 
the selling pressure declines from portfolio 6 to portfolio 4, we expect the portfolio 
returns to decrease from portfolio 1 to portfolio 3, and we expect the absolute value of 
portfolio returns to decrease from portfolio 6 to portfolio 4. 
The robustness of the portfolio returns is tested by risk adjusting the returns 
using several factor model specifications. First, Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
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described in Sharpe (1964) and Litner (1965) is used with MKT (market) as a single 
source of adjustment. A second model includes the two Fama-French (1993) factors 
SMB (Size) and HML (Book-to-market). In order to differentiate the BUY and SELL 
returns from the more popular momentum returns, we add the MOM (momentum) 
factor (Carhart (1997) 4-factor model) and re-examine the returns of portfolio 1 
through 6.  
2.2.3. Determinants of BUY minus SELL Portfolio Returns 
We construct the Buy minus Sell Portfolio by taking a long position in 
Portfolio 1 and a simultaneous short position in Portfolio 6. The difference between 
the returns of Portfolio 1 and Portfolio 6 gives us the Buy minus Sell (BMS) return.  
We identify eight variables that could potentially explain the BMS factor. The 
variables are: The first variable is Business Cycle (BC). Extant literature suggests that 
momentum returns vary with business cycle (Avramov and Chordia (2006), Chordia 
and Shivakumar (2002)).  To the extent persistence in buying and selling could be 
caused by herding of uninformed traders, we believe it is likely to vary across 
expansionary vs. contractionary phases in the market. The business cycle indicator is 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED database. 
Default spread and term spread are two standard macroeconomic variables 
used to predict market returns. The default spread (DS) is defined as the difference 
between the average yield of bonds rated BAA by Moody’s and the average yield of 
bonds with a Moody’s rating of AAA, and is included to capture the effect of default 
premiums. Fama and French (1988) show that default premiums track long-term 
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business cycle conditions, and document the fact that this variable is higher during 
recessions and lower during expansions. The term spread (TS) is measured as the 
difference between the average yield of Treasury bonds with more than 10 years to 
maturity and the average yield of T-bills that mature in three months. Fama and 
French (1988) show that this variable is closely related to short-term business cycles. 
We also use three different measures of market sentiment. The variables are: 
(1) the percentage of stocks whose price decreased via-a-vis the previous trading day 
(PCT_down), (2) The natural logarithm of the volatility index VIX, which is used to 
measure market's expectation of stock market volatility in short term, (3) Baker and 
Wurgler’s Investor sentiment index. Apart from these, we include market 
capitalization of the portfolio and the return on S&P 500 index (Market proxy) in the 
regression specification. The specification used is: 
      BMSt = α + β1BCt + β2CAPt + β3PCT_downt + β4ln _SP500t + β5ln _VIXt +
                      β
6
DSt + β7TSt + β8SIt + εt                                (2) 
3. Empirical Results 
Table I presents some annual descriptive statistics of the sample used in this 
study. The number of stocks in each year is fairly uniform. There is a slight decline in 
2009 and 2010. Similarly the number of daily stock data in each year (sum of all the 
trading days across all the stocks in the sample) is also fairly uniform. This number is 
less than (Number of trading days in the year) * (Number of stocks), because not all 
stocks survive in the sample for the entire year. Some stocks drop out because of 
delisting; however the majority of the lost data point losses may be attributed to 
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illiquidity. On each trading day we drop 20% of the most illiquid stocks from the 
sample. Total market capitalization and the trading volume have increased through 
time. 
Table II presents the descriptive statistics (by year) for the six portfolios 
described in section 2.2. Portfolio 1 (P1) consists of the 10% most heavily bought 
stocks (in terms of fraction of buyer vs. seller initiated trades in the stock). P6 
represents the 10% most heavily sold stocks in the sample. Panel A presents the 
average daily market capitalization of the portfolios in each year. Comparing these 
numbers with the sample market cap in Table I, Panel A of Table II suggests that our 
portfolios (heavily bought and heavily sold stocks) mostly consist of relatively larger 
stocks in the sample. The smaller stocks seem to fall in the 30
th
 to the 70
th
 percentile 
in terms of fraction of buyer vs. seller initiated stocks. Once again, we do see the 
increase in market capitalization through time. It declines post 2007.  
Table II, Panel B presents the portfolio breakpoints in terms of the fraction of 
buyer vs. seller initiated trades. For example, we see that in 1993, portfolio 1 
consisted of stocks which had 89.69% of all trades initiated from the buy side, as 
opposed to portfolio 6 which had only 9.89% trades initiated by buyers (91.11% 
trades initiated by the seller). Similarly Portfolio 2 consisted of stocks with 75.62 to 
89.69% of the trades coming from the buy side. An interesting observation, which 
may be made from this table, is that through time, all the breakpoints seem to be 
gravitating towards 50%. That is the P1, P2, and P3 breakpoints are declining while 
the P4, P5, and P6 breakpoints are increasing. While we do not explore what could be 
 18 
causing this trend, the numbers could have implication for the profitability of the 
strategy we are exploring in this paper. Hypothesis 4 would suggest that the declining 
buying pressure (through time) in portfolio 1 and the decreasing selling pressure in 
portfolio 6 should lead to declining strategy returns through time. We do observe a 
declining trend especially in portfolios 1, 2, and 3 (Table IV) as well as in the overall 
strategy (Figure 1). 
3.1. Autocorrelation in Stock Returns 
The average annual first order autocorrelation in stock returns is summarized 
in Table III. Panel A reports the autocorrelations based on open to close trade price. 
Since returns based on trade prices are likely to be affected by concerns of bid-ask 
bounce, we present autocorrelations based on quote mid-point returns. The numbers 
in the two panels are qualitatively similar and therefore we believe that our results are 
not driven by bid-ask bounces. The reported numbers are calculated as the average 
equation (1) β coefficient. The coefficients are averaged across all stocks for each of 
the six portfolios, by year. Two main results are of interest here. First, almost all 
autocorrelations are almost always positive. This supports our Hypothesis 1.  To the 
extent that the reported autocorrelation is at a stock level (averaged within each 




A second result lies in the relative strength of the autocorrelation. In general 
                                                             
8
 Most studies of autocorrelation in individual stock returns have focused on the average 
autocorrelation of groups of firms, finding it to be usually statistically insignificant. For example see 
Safvenblad (2000). 
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the magnitude of autocorrelation is higher for Portfolios 6 and portfolio 1 respectively. 
The average autocorrelation (across the 18 years) in stock returns is found to be 3%, 
1.4%, 0.9% among portfolios 1, 2 and 3 stocks respectively. Among the sell pressure 
portfolio stocks, the average autocorrelations are 2.9%, 1.8%, and 1.2% for portfolios 
6, 5 and 4 respectively. These results lend support to hypothesis 2. 
The results in Table III generally support the underlying assumption of 
persistence in buyer and seller initiated trades. The positive autocorrelations suggest 
that stocks that earned positive returns on day (t-1) are also likely to earn positive 
return on day (t), and similarly vice versa for stocks that earned negative returns on 
day (t-1). Since the grouping of the stocks are based on the relative buy or sell 
pressures, the persistence in the performance from day (t-1) to day (t) might be 
indicative of persistence in buying and selling. In other words, on average, stocks 
those were among the most bought stocks on day (t-1) are more likely to have greater 
volume of buyer initiated trade on day (t) then seller initiated trades. Similarly, the set 
of stocks that were heavily sold on day (t-1) are more likely to be sold than bought on 
day (t).  
3.2. BUY and SELL Portfolio Returns 
Table IV, Panel A presents the returns from buying the portfolios on day (t) 
morning and selling them at market close on the same day. The portfolios are 
constructed using the fractional buy and sell volumes on day (t-1). All returns in 
Portfolio 1 (Barring 2007 and 2008) are positive. Portfolios with relatively lower buy 
pressure (Portfolio 2 and portfolio 3) have mixed positive and negative returns. In all 
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but three years (2003, 2004, and 2006) the SELL portfolio (P6) earns a negative 
return. Interestingly on the sell side portfolios, P4 and P5 continue to demonstrate 
negative returns. These results suggest that the top 10% most bought stocks on day 
(t-1) are more likely to be purchased on day (t). However, this trend dissipates fairly 
quickly as the buy pressure reduces. The day (t) returns are found to be about 33.9% 
average per annum for portfolio 1; this reduces to 12.4% for portfolio 2 and 0% for 
portfolio 3. The day (t) returns are most negative for the 10% of the stocks, which 
were most heavily sold on day (t-1). Portfolio 6 earns an average return of about -36% 
per annum. It reduces to -35% per annum for portfolio 5 and -31.7% for portfolio 4. 
Thus, the selling effect seems to be more persistent in that, stocks that were heavily 
sold on day (t-1) are more likely to be sold on day (t). A possible explanation for this 
could be stronger sentiments in the market following selling than buying. 
In the next set of analysis, we try to adjust the portfolio returns for various 
known risk factors. Table IV, Panel B1 presents the CAPM market adjusted daily 
alphas for the various portfolios. Portfolio 1 earns an average of 12 basis points daily 
abnormal return, while portfolio 6 loses about 16 basis points per day. T-stats are 
presented in the parenthesis below the coefficients. The numbers are almost all highly 
significant. Table IV, Panel B2 adjusts the daily portfolio returns for the Fama and 
French SMB (Size) and HML (Book to market) factors. Portfolios 1 and 6 continue to 
demonstrate abnormal returns similar to that seen in Panel B1. Since our BUY and 
SELL portfolio returns could potentially be simply a short-term manifestation of the 
well-established momentum effect, we use the Carhart (1995) four factor model to 
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risk adjust the returns. Table IV, Panel B3 presents the alphas adjusted for the two 
Fama-French factors, the CAPM market factor, and the momentum factor (MOM). 
Portfolio 1 and portfolio 6 returns remain qualitatively unchanged. 
Our naïve strategy involves taking a long position in portfolio 1 and a 
simultaneous short position in portfolio 6 at market open. We hold these positions till 
the end of the trading day and before the market closes, we reverse our positions and 
exit the market. Table V presents the results of this trading strategy, by year. The 
numbers represent the average daily return from holding the above long-short 
positions. The first column presents the raw unadjusted returns. Second column 
adjusts the returns for the CAPM market factor. Third column adds the two 
Fama-French factors (HML, SMB), and finally the fourth column brings in the MOM 
(momentum) factor. The daily returns range from 48 bp to 42 bp from 1993 to 1998. 
Post 1998 the returns decline steadily and the lowest returns are in 2006 and 2007 
(about 7.3 bp per day).  
The positive return in 2007 might seem puzzling at first glance because all 
stock returns declined in that year; however, by taking a closer look at Table IV, Panel 
A reveals that in 2007, sell portfolio observed a greater decline (short position) than 
the buy portfolio (long position) thus leading to an overall positive return. Figure 1 
presents the annualized, unadjusted returns of the above trading strategy. The 
annualized numbers are calculated as the sum of the daily returns in each year.  The 
average annual daily return from the long-short trading strategy is found to be about 
27.89 bp. Adjusting for CAPM reduces it marginally to 26.57 bp. Additional risk 
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adjustment using the Fama-French factors and the momentum factors do not make 
any significant difference.  
Momentum factors have been noted to earn negative returns in January. Figure 
2 presents the daily returns from the BUY-SELL portfolio, by year and month. There 
are no consistent patterns in any monthly return. Figure 3 presents the BUY-SELL 
returns by day of the week. For sake of clarity, we present only Monday and Friday 
returns in the figure. Monday returns are found to be consistently greater than Friday 
returns. A possible explanation for this may be found in Abraham and Ikenberry, 
(1994), and, Lakonishok, and Maberly (1990). According to them, Individual 
investors are likely to devote weekends for fundamental research and therefore, they 
are more likely to be active on Monday than on other weekdays. At the same time, 
institutional investors devote Monday morning to strategically planning the remaining 
week, thereby being less active traders than usual. 
Ariel (1987) reported a noticeable difference in mean returns for the nine-day 
period stretching from the last business day of a month to the eighth business day of 
the subsequent month as compared to returns measured over a nine-day period 
preceding the month-end. This effect was named “turn of the month effect” and has 
since become another of the widely researched and debated calendar anomalies in the 
financial market. Figure 4 compares the daily BUY-SELL portfolio returns by year, 
for the first 10 days of the month, vs. the last 10 days of the month. We find that in all 
the sample years, the strategy earned higher return during the first ten days of the 
month, compared to the last 10 days of the month. 
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3.3. Taking a Closer Look at the Returns 
The results thus far seem to suggest that the BUY-SELL portfolio tends to earn 
a significant positive abnormal return even after adjusting for the CAPM, 
Fama-French and Momentum risk factors. In this section we use the specification laid 
out in equation (2) to get some understanding of the potential driver of the 
above-observed BUY SELL portfolio returns. Table VI presents the Spearman and 
Pearson correlation coefficients between BMS and the explanatory variables in 
equation (2).  
Table VII presents the results of running reduced and full from of equations (2) 
while controlling for the market cap of the BUY minus SELL portfolio, we find the 
following results: BMS is positively related with the Baker and Wurgler’s Investor 
sentiment index (SI) suggesting that the returns from the BUY-SELL portfolio is 
likely to be higher in periods of high sentiment. This can be a result of either strong 
persistence in BUY portfolio and/or strong persistence in SELL portfolio. PCT_down 
is estimated as the fraction of stocks whose price went down on the given day, 
vis-à-vis their closing prices on the previous day. A high value of this variable would 
denote a slump in the market. VIX measures investor expectations for market 
volatility in the next 30 days as implied by the skew of S&P 500 index options, and 
has been dubbed the “Investor Fear Gauge” When the VIX is high (i.e. when implied 
volatility is high), investor sentiment is presumed to be low since investors are 
assumed to be risk averse. Therefore the negative correlation between these variables 
and BMS is consistent with the positive relation between BMS and SI. 
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The Business Cycle dummy takes the value 1 for recession and 0 for 
expansion. The negative coefficient suggests that the BUY-SELL returns are likely to 
be low during periods of recession. A possible explanation for this could be small 
investors and sentiment traders are likely to keep out of the market during periods of 
recession. The coefficients on default spreads are significantly positive, while the 
coefficients on term spreads are significantly negative. To the extent that Default 
spreads are high during recession and low during expansion (Fama-French 1988), this 
result is somewhat puzzling. The S&P 500 coefficient is significantly positive 
suggesting that the BUY-SELL strategies earn higher return when the market moves 
up.  
4. The BMS Factor 
The analysis thus far seems to suggest that the BUY-SELL return is not 
entirely related to the characteristics of the constituent stocks. The results in Table VII 
bring up the role of investor sentiments, business cycle and economic stability 
(default and term spreads). The results from Table IV, similarly brings out the inability 
of the various factor models to explain the BUY and SELL portfolio returns. We 
conjecture that the BMS returns might be possibly picking a short-term asset-pricing 
factor, which is not accounted for by either the CAPM market factor, or, the 
Fama-French SMB and HML factors, or the Carhart Momentum factor. We explore 
this aspect of the BUY – SELL return in two set of tests.  
First, we examine how the BMS return factor performs vis-à-vis the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Fama-French (1993) model, and, Carhart (1997) model. 
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This is achieved by comparing the following three pairs of model R
2
:  
Rit −  Rrt = αiT + biTRMRFt + εit                                     (3)                                                              
 Rit − Rrt = αiT + miTBMSt + biTRMRFt + εit                           (4)                                   
Rit −  Rrt = αiT + biTRMRFt + siTSMBt + hiTHMLt + εit                  (5)                          
 Rit − Rrt = αiT + miTBMSt + biTRMRFt + siTSMBt + hiTHMLt + εit        (6)                  
Rit −  Rrt = αiT + biTRMRFt + siTSMBt + hiTHMLt + uiTUMDt + εit        (7)                       
Rit − Rrt = αiT + miTBMSt + biTRMRFt + siTSMBt + hiTHMLt + uiTUMDt + εit       
(8)  
We estimate each model specification for each stock in each year. The model R
2
 in a 
given year is estimated as the cross-sectional average of adjusted R-squares from the 
stock level regression in that year. This provides an intuitive measure that expresses 
the fraction of the average excess returns captured by the model. We compare 
adjusted R
2
 of equations (3) with (4); (5) with (6); and finally (7) with (8). The results 
are presented in Table VIII. Although the adjusted R
2
 show a very small increase 
across each comparison, the magnitude of the increase is very small.  
Second, the results in Table VII seem to suggest that there might be some 
relation between firm size and the BUY-SELL returns. In order to explore this, we 
sort all the stocks in the sample into size quintile portfolios. Thus portfolio Q1 
consists of the 20% of the largest stocks by market capitalization and Q5 represents 
the 20% of the smallest stocks in the sample. Portfolio return is estimated as the 
equally weighted average return of all constituents. We run the following regression to 
identify the relationship between size and the BMS return: 
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Rit − Rrt = αiT + β1iTBMSt + β2iTMRFt + β3iTSMBt + β4iTHMLt + β5iTUMDt + εit  
(9)  
We estimate the above equation for each size quintile portfolio in each year. The 
results are presented in Table IX. 
The BMS coefficients for all the Q1 portfolios in all the years (except 2001, 
2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007) are positive. The negative coefficients in the above five 
years are statistically non-significant. All the Q5 portfolios have negative coefficient 
except in years 2001, 2003, and 2009. This suggests that in general the trades in big 
stocks are more likely to be buyer initiated while the small stock transactions are more 
likely to be seller initiated. A closer examination of the numbers in Table IX reveals 
that from 1994 to 1999, which was a rising market, BMS coefficients are positive and 
significant in all Q1 portfolios (In 1996, the t-statistic is equal to 1.64, which is 
marginally significant). The coefficients are relatively insignificant for Q5 portfolios, 
suggesting that there was no significant buying or selling behaviours for small-cap 
stock portfolios. Thus, high volume of buyer initiated trading in large cap stocks 
marked the bullish period. The Q5 portfolio BMS coefficients are significantly 
negative from 2005 to 2008 (t-values are equal to -6.22, -4, -8.795 and -5.25 
respectively). The Q1 coefficients are non-significant during these years. This 
suggests that high volume of seller initiated trading in small stocks marked the market 
downturn. 
5. Conclusion 
We start this study with a conjecture that in the short run, buying and selling 
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pressures are likely to be persistent. We attempt to find evidence in support of this 
conjecture by devising a three-step naïve trading strategy. Step 1: We observe all 
buying and selling across all stocks in the market on day (t). At market close, we 
eliminate 20% of the least liquid stocks from the population and rank the remaining 
80% into deciles based on the fraction of buyer initiated trade to total traded volume. 
We designate the decile with the 10% most heavily bought stocks as BUY portfolio 
and the decile with 10% most heavily sold stock as SELL portfolio. Step 2: On day 
(t+1), at market open, take a long position in BUY portfolio and a simultaneous short 
position in SELL portfolio. Step 3: reverse the positions at market close on day (t+1), 
and exit the market. We find that this strategy earned an average return of about 47 
basis points per day in 1993, decreased to 7.3 basis points per day in 2006 and 2007. 
Since then the returns have increased 20.5 bp in 2008 and 2009 and 10 bp in 2010. 
The strategy returns are robust to CAPM, Fama-French and Momentum factor 
risk adjustment. The returns are positively related to investor sentiment in the market 
as well as to economic stability measures such as term spread and de-stability factors 
such as default spread. At least some of the returns seem to be related to market cap, 
with large cap stocks contributing to the BUY portfolio and the small cap stocks 
contributing to SELL portfolio. The results suggest that during expansionary phase in 
the market, the trading in large cap stocks are more likely to be buyer initiated, while 
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Figure 1: This figure presents the annualized portfolio return differences between the “buy” portfolio 
(Portfolio 1) and the “sell” portfolio (Portfolio 6) before adjusting common risk factors from 1993 to 
2010. The return differences are presented in percentage. 
    
Figure 2: This figure presents the equal-weighted average portfolio return differences between the “buy” 
portfolio (Portfolio 1) and the “sell” portfolio (Portfolio 6) in each month and each year before adjusting 


























































Figure 3: This figure presents the equal-weighted average portfolio return differences between the “buy” 
portfolio (Portfolio 1) and the “sell” portfolio (Portfolio 6) in each day of a week each year before 
adjusting common risk factors from 1993 to 2010. 
 
Figure 4: This figure presents the equal-weighted average portfolio return differences between the “buy” 
portfolio (Portfolio 1) and the “sell” portfolio (Portfolio 6) in the first ten calendar days, in the last ten 
calendar days, and in the period between these two intervals before adjusting common risk factors from 




















































Average portfolio return differences in first ten calender days, last ten 









This table provides various aggregate trading statistics for our sample for the period 1993-2010. We report 
the total number of stocks, the total number of firm days, the total number of trades, the average market 
capitalization per stock per day and the average trading volume per stock per day in each year. For the 
whole 18 year, there are total numbers of 145,060 stocks and total 37,227,391,369 trades in our sample.    
year # of stocks # of firm days # of trades mean market cap mean trading vol 
1993 7892 1,181,370 78,589,384 583,321 246,797.16 
1994 8471 1,281,050 83,697,192 615,488 189,459.94 
1995 8886 1,364,282 111,929,561 589,924 219,201.82 
1996 9495 1,481,532 146,581,934 756,729 306,879.65 
1997 9759 1,561,355 192,878,907 875,534 260,734.83 
1998 9634 1,510,495 269,244,475 1,170,438 249,968.42 
1999 9289 1,390,991 464,255,230 1,507,089 640,073.45 
2000 8954 1,317,221 787,857,366 2,002,587 668,383.48 
2001 8252 1,259,259 800,526,157 1,870,884 525,418.99 
2002 7627 1,244,234 908,860,888 1,861,941 515,112.89 
2003 7158 1,148,429 1,123,368,844 1,588,919 491,742.53 
2004 7035 1,146,849 1,480,623,113 2,131,592 629,972.02 
2005 7112 1,144,324 1,824,460,442 2,339,777 790,712.20 
2006 7176 1,111,171 2,502,699,322 2,555,054 880,571.47 
2007 7437 1,122,263 4,425,067,834 2,727,543 1,048,712.59 
2008 7176 1,127,460 7,861,167,695 2,886,805 884,123.80 
2009 6876 1,035,774 7,253,222,578 1,884,208 997,419.25 
2010 6831 1,047,258 6,912,360,447 2,468,316 1,151,182.42 

















   Summary Statistics 
These two tables provide descriptive statistics for our sample for the period 1993-2010. Panel A reports 
the average portfolio market capitalizations in each year. Panel B reports the average breakpoints of 
deciles of percentage of buyer-initiated trades in each portfolio each year. Portfolio 1 contains 10% of 
stocks with the highest fraction of buyer-initiated trades and Portfolio 6 contains 10% of stocks with the 
highest fraction of seller-initiated trades. Portfolio 2 (5) contains stocks which 80% to 90% of trades are 
buyer (seller)-initiated trades; Portfolio 3(4) contains stocks which over 70% but less than 80% of trades 
are buyer (seller)-initiated trades.  
 
              
Panel A  Mean Market Cap 
          
year P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
1993 1,524,393.00 2,820,703.92 3,908,142.41 2,536,372.33 1,635,667.08 1,023,626.16 
1994 1,495,695.82 2,901,284.48 4,092,544.80 2,338,646.57 1,521,696.73 1,025,810.32 
1995 1,718,911.65 3,454,296.84 5,018,781.11 2,879,761.02 1,809,281.68 1,124,418.78 
1996 1,965,271.04 4,126,630.92 6,054,684.26 3,350,161.26 2,095,048.94 1,254,366.83 
1997 1,915,103.43 4,669,096.03 7,729,877.28 4,118,604.82 2,284,345.59 1,325,057.41 
1998 2,030,959.78 5,928,527.03 10,575,362.55 4,208,049.76 2,200,827.31 1,143,328.99 
1999 2,062,072.63 7,949,646.17 14,331,244.80 5,786,366.44 2,522,139.77 1,063,294.62 
2000 2,959,733.71 12,093,751.19 20,479,866.52 8,033,718.34 2,958,517.96 1,097,862.94 
2001 2,873,358.97 10,960,566.84 17,630,518.05 7,302,318.75 2,547,067.37 899,213.85 
2002 2,777,025.57 10,842,320.51 17,401,798.23 6,375,601.15 2,162,369.67 856,524.47 
2003 3,470,975.49 10,997,262.87 16,631,860.82 9,228,414.49 3,185,355.93 1,173,811.71 
2004 6,251,138.62 15,637,598.04 20,904,716.75 12,865,198.83 4,739,334.86 1,849,104.61 
2005 7,197,260.80 18,268,667.08 24,600,307.77 16,960,997.44 6,624,377.56 2,196,867.45 
2006 8,907,147.75 21,966,109.04 30,483,615.00 24,449,741.13 9,574,647.43 3,503,209.13 
2007 10,195,004.38 25,826,981.01 43,407,168.78 26,832,309.58 12,320,317.73 4,632,299.98 
2008 5,199,274.10 18,827,157.49 46,022,435.10 26,801,094.29 10,773,778.76 2,907,741.71 
2009 3,713,178.99 14,225,741.11 32,454,141.95 26,279,197.09 10,519,117.89 3,158,865.27 













              
Panel B  Percentage of buyer-initiated trades 
year P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
1993 89.69% 75.62% 66.07% 33.58% 23.90% 9.89% 
1994 89.28% 74.78% 65.14% 32.50% 22.81% 9.27% 
1995 89.30% 74.85% 65.32% 34.17% 24.48% 10.15% 
1996 88.65% 73.77% 64.40% 34.73% 25.21% 10.54% 
1997 87.80% 72.94% 64.04% 35.67% 26.47% 11.56% 
1998 86.65% 71.53% 62.97% 35.44% 26.18% 11.32% 
1999 86.07% 70.44% 62.01% 36.03% 26.76% 11.51% 
2000 84.63% 68.88% 60.99% 37.67% 28.76% 12.72% 
2001 83.99% 69.03% 61.87% 39.87% 31.42% 14.93% 
2002 82.38% 67.82% 61.42% 40.75% 32.53% 16.02% 
2003 80.82% 67.24% 61.43% 43.26% 36.23% 20.13% 
2004 78.07% 65.25% 60.25% 44.25% 38.25% 22.40% 
2005 76.21% 63.89% 59.20% 44.23% 38.57% 23.54% 
2006 74.60% 62.84% 58.48% 44.79% 39.67% 25.36% 
2007 71.10% 59.80% 56.05% 44.50% 39.90% 26.45% 
2008 69.60% 57.29% 53.79% 44.40% 39.94% 25.68% 
2009 70.36% 58.20% 54.47% 44.89% 40.74% 27.61% 
2010 69.49% 58.61% 54.91% 44.94% 41.00% 29.50% 
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                                                              Table III 
The average coefficients of AR (1) model for six portfolios and the p-values of mean coefficients test 
 
These two tables report the average coefficients of the first order autocorrelation of stock returns for six portfolios formed according to the percentage of 
buyer-initiated trades in each year. These tables also presents the p-values of the one-tailed means test to verify whether the average coefficients in each portfolio are 
significantly greater than zero or not. Ave_coef is the average coefficient in each portfolio each year from 1993 to 2010 and mean_test_p is the p-value of the 
hypothesis test. The AR (1) model is shown as Rt,i = α +  βRt−1,i+ εt, where Rt,I is stock i’s return on day t and Rt-1 is stock i’s return on its previous day. In Panel 
A, the stock return is calculated by using the natural logarithm of stock’s closing price divided by opening price. In order to remove the bid ask bounce effect, we 
also use the natural logarithm of the midpoint of closing bid and closing ask price divided by stock’s opening price to calculate stock return. Panel B reports these 
robustness results for adjusting bid ask bounce. Portfolio 1 contains 10% of stocks with the highest fraction of buyer-initiated trades in a particular day and Portfolio 
6 contains 10% of stocks with the highest fraction of seller-initiated trades. Portfolio 2 (5) contains stocks which 80% to 90% of trades are buyer (seller)-initiated 
trades; Portfolio 3(4) contains stocks which over 70% but less than 80% of trades are buyer (seller)-initiated trades. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Panel A                     
 
  
Port 1 Port 2 Port3 Port 4 Port 5 Port 6 
 
 
year Ave_coef mean_test_p Ave_coef mean_test_p Ave_coef mean_test_p Ave_coef mean_test_p Ave_coef mean_test_p Ave_coef mean_test_p 
 
 





1994 0.021 0.004*** 0.026 0.000*** 0.047 0.002*** 0.012 0.081* 0.009 0.133 0.020 0.015** 
 
 
1995 0.033 0.000*** 0.016 0.004*** -0.004 0.423 0.011 0.029** -0.003 0.299 0.004 0.329 
 
 
1996 0.039 0.000*** 0.028 0.000*** 0.013 0.038** 0.017 0.001*** 0.022 0.080* 0.032 0.083* 
 
 
1997 0.062 0.042** 0.011 0.031** 0.001 0.419 -0.003 0.394 0.013 0.013** 0.013 0.028** 
 
 
1998 0.051 0.000*** 0.032 0.000*** 0.036 0.000*** 0.035 0.004*** 0.044 0.000*** 0.025 0.001*** 
 
 
1999 0.038 0.000*** 0.020 0.002*** 0.017 0.008*** 0.022 0.001*** 0.025 0.000*** 0.004 0.366 
 
 
2000 0.034 0.016** 0.015 0.122 0.010 0.133 0.027 0.011** 0.016 0.079* 0.141 0.108 
 
 
2001 0.031 0.000*** 0.050 0.005*** 0.046 0.000*** 0.039 0.000*** 0.048 0.000*** 0.026 0.001*** 
 
 
2002 0.012 0.111 -0.001 0.431 -0.009 0.296 0.007 0.221 0.031 0.001*** 0.028 0.017** 
 
 
2003 0.009 0.171 0.029 0.086* -0.002 0.411 0.017 0.041** 0.003 0.374 0.019 0.042** 
 
 
2004 0.160 0.112 0.011 0.156 0.011 0.074* 0.026 0.000*** 0.047 0.000*** 0.030 0.023** 
 
 
2005 0.012 0.111 0.011 0.074* 0.003 0.311 0.008 0.291 0.012 0.056* 0.033 0.010*** 
 
 
2006 0.003 0.389 0.000 0.495 0.005 0.264 -0.018 0.179 -0.001 0.437 0.032 0.009*** 
 
 
2007 -0.007 0.221 -0.005 0.288 -0.009 0.087* -0.018 0.029** -0.012 0.052* 0.001 0.471 
 
 
2008 0.010 0.146 -0.007 0.194 -0.036 0.015** 0.005 0.287 0.011 0.154 0.046 0.000*** 
 
 
2009 0.015 0.063* -0.003 0.348 -0.005 0.262 -0.005 0.240 0.016 0.020** 0.016 0.058* 
 
 






                          
Panel B 
             Port 1 Port 2 Port3 Port 4 Port 5 Port 6 
year Ave_coef mean_test_p Ave_coef mean_test_p Ave_coef mean_test_p Ave_coef mean_test_p Ave_coef mean_test_p Ave_coef mean_test_p 
1993 0.040  0.072*  0.064  0.000***  0.072  0.004***  0.033  0.002***  0.037  0.003***  0.044  0.000***  
1994 0.022  0.211  0.050  0.000***  0.048  0.000***  0.060  0.003***  0.067  0.000***  0.006  0.392  
1995 0.069  0.000***  0.072  0.000***  0.052  0.039**  0.015  0.215  0.033  0.088*  -0.057  0.263  
1996 0.041  0.195  0.059  0.000***  0.022  0.012**  0.068  0.003***  0.047  0.001***  0.006  0.419  
1997 0.055  0.000***  0.023  0.009***  0.022  0.011**  0.029  0.014**  0.041  0.000***  0.015  0.154  
1998 0.077  0.000***  0.033  0.028**  0.045  0.000***  0.052  0.000***  0.061  0.000***  0.037  0.000***  
1999 0.069  0.000***  0.023  0.127  0.044  0.000***  0.033  0.000***  0.044  0.001***  0.047  0.111  
2000 0.075  0.017**  0.038  0.000***  0.050  0.002***  0.049  0.000***  0.036  0.262  0.070  0.003***  
2001 0.052  0.000***  0.047  0.000***  0.061  0.000***  0.057  0.000***  0.064  0.000***  0.051  0.000***  
2002 0.021  0.025**  0.010  0.181  0.013  0.110  0.021  0.004***  0.031  0.005***  -0.055  0.269  
2003 0.023  0.050**  0.011  0.086*  0.015  0.043**  0.023  0.005***  0.010  0.326  0.039  0.000***  
2004 0.048  0.000***  0.025  0.025**  0.021  0.044**  0.027  0.002***  0.057  0.000***  0.047  0.001***  
2005 0.018  0.039**  0.015  0.030**  0.019  0.005***  0.015  0.066*  0.022  0.020**  0.050  0.053*  
2006 0.035  0.003***  0.014  0.050**  0.020  0.011**  0.036  0.004***  0.004  0.343  0.038  0.004***  
2007 0.000  0.494  0.009  0.174  -0.008  0.188  -0.010  0.221  -0.012  0.109  0.009  0.219  
2008 0.151  0.155  -0.027  0.121  -0.009  0.147  0.022  0.019**  0.027  0.001***  0.045  0.056*  
2009 0.035  0.001***  -0.002  0.406  0.005  0.267  0.490  0.158  0.017  0.049**  0.028  0.007***  
2010 0.037  0.006***  0.005  0.278  0.006  0.255  0.014  0.056*  0.007  0.207  0.009  0.279  
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                                        Table IV 
The six portfolio returns before and after adjusting the common risk factors 
 
 
These tables report the returns of six different portfolios formed according to stocks’ percentage of 
buyer-initiated trades. Portfolio 1 contains 10% of stocks with the highest fraction of buyer-initiated trades in 
a particular day and Portfolio 6 contains 10% of stocks with the highest fraction of seller-initiated trades. 
Portfolio 2 (5) contains stocks which 80% to 90% of trades are buyer (seller)-initiated trades; Portfolio 3(4) 
contains stocks which over 70% but less than 80% of trades are buyer (seller)-initiated trades. Panel A 
reports the portfolio returns before adjusting common risk factors. All of the portfolios have equal weights, 
and in each year, the portfolio returns are calculated by taking the simple average of daily portfolio returns. 
Panel B1 reports the portfolio alphas after adjusting the market risk factor. Panel B2 reports the portfolio 
alphas after adjusting the market factor, size factor, and book-to-market factor. Panel B3 reports the portfolio 
alphas after adjusting the market, size, book-to-market and then momentum factor. The t-statistics are given 





































       Panel A 
      Year P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
1993 0.00308 0.00224 0.00191 -0.00138 -0.00147 -0.00160 
1994 0.00246 0.00172 0.00121 -0.00183 -0.00198 -0.00230 
1995 0.00336 0.00288 0.00238 -0.00048 -0.00098 -0.00120 
1996 0.00301 0.00221 0.00153 -0.00156 -0.00169 -0.00168 
1997 0.00247 0.00174 0.00090 -0.00134 -0.00141 -0.00202 
1998 0.00096 -0.00007 -0.00077 -0.00263 -0.00296 -0.00325 
1999 0.00115 0.00015 -0.00067 -0.00219 -0.00239 -0.00214 
2000 0.00033 -0.00068 -0.00222 -0.00458 -0.00457 -0.00343 
2001 0.00204 0.00119 0.00028 -0.00114 -0.00132 -0.00111 
2002 0.00167 -0.00010 -0.00077 -0.00082 -0.00054 -0.00035 
2003 0.00305 0.00149 0.00122 0.00109 0.00118 0.00152 
2004 0.00170 0.00029 -0.00026 -0.00006 -0.00004 0.00029 
2005 0.00067 -0.00033 -0.00075 -0.00068 -0.00066 -0.00027 
2006 0.00083 0.00000 -0.00017 0.00014 0.00004 0.00009 
2007 -0.00011 -0.00103 -0.00113 -0.00071 -0.00091 -0.00083 
2008 -0.00301 -0.00303 -0.00250 -0.00315 -0.00384 -0.00506 
2009 0.00045 -0.00010 -0.00008 -0.00075 -0.00107 -0.00169 
2010 0.00008 0.00002 -0.00015 -0.00064 -0.00066 -0.00097 
Average 0.00134 0.00048 0.00000 -0.00126 -0.00140 -0.00144 






Panel B1 CAPM-model 
  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
year Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha 
1993 0.00293  0.00206  0.00175  -0.00155  -0.00162  -0.00176  
 
(13.317)  (8.669)  (6.113)  (-5.028)  (-6.050)  (-6.872)  
1994 0.00232  0.00158  0.00107  -0.00197 -0.00211 -0.00244 
 
(9.227)  (5.571)  (3.304)  (-6.122)  (-6.957)  (-8.756)  
1995 0.00309  0.00254  0.00204  -0.00081  -0.00126  -0.00151  
 
(15.442)  (10.755)  (7.565)  (-2.824)  (-5.191)  (-6.900)  
1996 0.00274  0.00195  0.00128  -0.00181  -0.00192  -0.00192  
 
(11.293)  (6.717)  (3.658)  (-4.758)  (-6.008)  (-6.936)  
1997 0.00226  0.00158  0.00076  -0.00149  -0.00158  -0.00219  
 
(7.174)  (3.628)  (1.573)  (-3.161)  (-3.774)  (-6.345)  
1998 0.00068  -0.00034  -0.00104  -0.00289  -0.00322  -0.00352  
 
(1.494)  (-0.644)  (-1.740)  (-4.577)  (-5.655)  (-7.455)  
1999 0.00094  -0.00008  -0.00092  -0.00243  -0.00262  -0.00235  
 
(3.121)  (-0.222)  (-2.290)  (-6.055)  (-8.107)  (-8.205)  
2000 0.00016  -0.00084  -0.00237  -0.00469  -0.00470  -0.00358  
 
(0.392)  (-1.506)  (-3.247)  (-5.280)  (-6.569)  (-6.939)  
2001 0.00194  0.00108  0.00018  -0.00124  -0.00142  -0.00121  
 
(4.309)  (1.903)  (0.284)  (-1.655)  (-2.249)  (-2.502)  
2002 0.00166  -0.00014  -0.00081  -0.00085  -0.00058  -0.00038  
 
(3.476)  (-0.217)  (-1.118)  (-1.172)  (-0.942)  (-0.817)  
2003 0.00297  0.00143  0.00114  0.00099  0.00108  0.00139  
 
(8.906)  (3.114)  (2.281)  (1.838)  (2.506)  (4.262)  
2004 0.00159  0.00016  -0.00039  -0.00019  -0.00020  0.00017  
 
(4.843)  (0.382)  (-0.856)  (-0.360)  (-0.444)  (0.533)  
2005 0.00053  -0.00046  -0.00088  -0.00081  -0.00080  -0.00041  
 
(1.813)  (-1.206)  (-2.057)  (-1.854)  (-2.098)  (-1.512)  
2006 0.00058  -0.00024  -0.00043  -0.00011  -0.00022  -0.00017  
 
(1.785)  (-0.576)  (-0.927)  (-0.228)  (-0.535)  (-0.593)  
2007 -0.00029  -0.00121  -0.00131  -0.00089  -0.00110  -0.00102  
 
(-0.784)  (-2.388)  (-2.369)  (-1.675)  (-2.323)  (-3.027)  
2008 -0.00305  -0.00315  -0.00268  -0.00326  -0.00389  -0.00505  
 
(-2.796)  (-2.210)  (-1.747)  (-2.147)  (-2.852)  (-4.795)  
2009 0.00043  -0.00007  -0.00006  -0.00072  -0.00103  -0.00168  
 
(0.543)  (-0.064)  (-0.052)  (-0.629)  (-0.952)  (-1.994)  
2010 0.00003  -0.00003  -0.00021  -0.00069  -0.00072  -0.00102  
  (0.049)  (-0.056)  (-0.318)  (-1.062)  (-1.163)  (-1.996)  
Average 







       Panel B2 F&F-3-factor model         
 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
year Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha 
1993 0.00298 0.00213 0.00192 -0.00135 -0.00143 -0.00162 
 
(13.235) (8.791) (6.676) (-4.321) (-5.320) (-6.252) 
1994 0.00232 0.00158 0.00107 -0.00197 -0.00212 -0.00243 
 
(9.258) (5.578) (3.306) (-6.109) (-7.031) (-8.784) 
1995 0.00305 0.00250 0.00200 -0.00080 -0.00127 -0.00151 
 
(15.102) (10.507) (7.352) (-2.771) (-5.173) (-6.844) 
1996 0.00282 0.00205 0.00140 -0.00168 -0.00178 -0.00182 
 
(11.817) (7.232) (4.085) (-4.502) (-5.764) (-6.745) 
1997 0.00250 0.00192 0.00110 -0.00117 -0.00130 -0.00195 
 
(7.843) (4.352) (2.212) (-2.441) (-3.037) (-5.582) 
1998 0.00097 -0.00006 -0.00074 -0.00251 -0.00285 -0.00315 
 
(2.177) (-0.110) (-1.258) (-4.078) (-5.148) (-7.020) 
1999 0.00087 -0.00015 -0.00103 -0.00258 -0.00271 -0.00243 
 
(2.892) (-0.400) (-2.541) (-6.395) (-8.371) (-8.457) 
2000 0.00006 -0.00096 -0.00243 -0.00473 -0.00473 -0.00372 
 
(0.137) (-1.676) (-3.243) (-5.217) (-6.512) (-7.133) 
2001 0.00187 0.00108 0.00018 -0.00130 -0.00151 -0.00127 
 
(4.117) (1.882) (0.267) (-1.721) (-2.381) (-2.604) 
2002 0.00171 -0.00004 -0.00070 -0.00076 -0.00053 -0.00033 
 
(3.604) (-0.062) (-0.976) (-1.054) (-0.865) (-0.716) 
2003 0.00288 0.00127 0.00105 0.00090 0.00097 0.00129 
 
(8.530) (2.736) (2.068) (1.637) (2.226) (3.899) 
2004 0.00151 0.00007 -0.00048 -0.00030 -0.00026 0.00012 
 
(4.631) (0.163) (-1.075) (-0.564) (-0.587) (0.380) 
2005 0.00052 -0.00047 -0.00089 -0.00083 -0.00082 -0.00043 
 
(1.741) (-1.215) (-2.081) (-1.886) (-2.126) (-1.575) 
2006 0.00062 -0.00020 -0.00038 -0.00004 -0.00013 -0.00011 
 
(1.866) (-0.456) (-0.795) (-0.090) (-0.308) (-0.369) 
2007 -0.00032 -0.00123 -0.00132 -0.00087 -0.00105 -0.00097 
 
(-0.845) (-2.397) (-2.346) (-1.600) (-2.166) (-2.816) 
2008 -0.00302 -0.00308 -0.00263 -0.00320 -0.00386 -0.00503 
 
(-2.797) (-2.178) (-1.725) (-2.121) (-2.862) (-4.915) 
2009 0.00052 0.00004 0.00003 -0.00061 -0.00096 -0.00157 
 
(0.654) (0.036) (0.029) (-0.535) (-0.880) (-1.869) 
2010 0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00020 -0.00070 -0.00073 -0.00106 
 
(0.037) (-0.042) (-0.303) (-1.059) (-1.162) (-2.053) 
Average 





       Panel B3 Carhart 4-factor model       
  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
year Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha 
1993 0.00297 0.00212 0.00191 -0.00136 -0.00144 -0.00163 
 
(13.253) (8.805) (6.666) (-4.388) (-5.397) (-6.339) 
1994 0.00230 0.00157 0.00104 -0.00197 -0.00213 -0.00243 
 
(9.205) (5.526) (3.236) (-6.108) (-7.072) (-8.791) 
1995 0.00305 0.00250 0.00204 -0.00079 -0.00125 -0.00151 
 
(14.930) (10.359) (7.391) (-2.706) (-5.025) (-6.742) 
1996 0.00283 0.00206 0.00141 -0.00168 -0.00178 -0.00182 
 
(11.842) (7.249) (4.109) (-4.486) (-5.746) (-6.727) 
1997 0.00252 0.00193 0.00110 -0.00114 -0.00128 -0.00195 
 
(7.882) (4.343) (2.201) (-2.372) (-2.986) (-5.531) 
1998 0.00107 0.00005 -0.00062 -0.00237 -0.00270 -0.00306 
 
(2.408) (0.096) (-1.046) (-3.844) (-4.899) (-6.808) 
1999 0.00088 -0.00014 -0.00102 -0.00257 -0.00270 -0.00242 
 
(2.997) (-0.374) (-2.542) (-6.403) (-8.476) (-8.587) 
2000 0.00015 -0.00089 -0.00242 -0.00469 -0.00468 -0.00370 
 
(0.364) (-1.534) (-3.197) (-5.131) (-6.382) (-7.031) 
2001 0.00180 0.00105 0.00013 -0.00139 -0.00160 -0.00134 
 
(3.953) (1.821) (0.193) (-1.840) (-2.512) (-2.743) 
2002 0.00174 0.00000 -0.00068 -0.00070 -0.00047 -0.00029 
 
(3.660) (-0.005) (-0.944) (-0.969) (-0.769) (-0.636) 
2003 0.00289 0.00133 0.00109 0.00098 0.00106 0.00131 
 
(8.434) (2.822) (2.118) (1.771) (2.396) (3.925) 
2004 0.00157 0.00012 -0.00042 -0.00022 -0.00018 0.00017 
 
(4.806) (0.286) (-0.923) (-0.414) (-0.400) (0.519) 
2005 0.00051 -0.00047 -0.00091 -0.00084 -0.00083 -0.00042 
 
(1.706) (-1.216) (-2.106) (-1.899) (-2.135) (-1.535) 
2006 0.00060 -0.00020 -0.00040 -0.00009 -0.00019 -0.00014 
 
(1.765) (-0.457) (-0.821) (-0.194) (-0.437) (-0.457) 
2007 -0.00023 -0.00108 -0.00115 -0.00070 -0.00092 -0.00089 
 
(-0.595) (-2.105) (-2.056) (-1.301) (-1.902) (-2.579) 
2008 -0.00299 -0.00304 -0.00260 -0.00315 -0.00381 -0.00496 
 
(-2.763) (-2.144) (-1.699) (-2.087) (-2.821) (-4.857) 
2009 0.00050 0.00014 0.00014 -0.00043 -0.00083 -0.00150 
 
(0.617) (0.134) (0.127) (-0.370) (-0.748) (-1.754) 
2010 0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00020 -0.00070 -0.00073 -0.00106 
 
(0.039) (-0.041) (-0.305) (-1.068) (-1.173) (-2.072) 
Average 















Alphas for the long short portfolio 
 
This table studies the profitability of a trading strategy that long stocks with highest percentage of 
buyer-initiated trades and short stocks with the highest percentage of seller-initiated trades. Stocks which 
over 90% of trades are buyer-initiated trades are classified as the long portfolio and over 90% of trades are 
seller-initiated trades are classified as the short portfolio. Both of the portfolios are calculated by using 
equally-weighted stock returns, and both remain in portfolio for one day after the portfolio formation. The 
intercepts presented in this table are the return difference of the long short portfolio under the Carhart 4-factor 








              
 





Year Unadjusted  Intercept   Intercept   Intercept 







































































































































































































          
Average 0.002789  0.002657   
 
0.002640  
   
0.002638  
alphas       
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                                       Table VI 
Correlation statistics 
 
These two tables provide the Spearman correlation and Pearson Correlation estimates for the possible variables 
that may explain the BMS factor. BMS is our created factor which formed by taking the daily return difference 
between the “buy” portfolio, which includes stocks with the top 20% of buyer-initiated trades and the “sell” 
portfolio, which includes stocks with the top 20% of seller-initiated trades. Both the “buy” portfolio and “sell” 
portfolio have equal weights. ln_CAP, which is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of stock’s 
market capitalization which is calculated by using the average stocks’ market capitalizations in the 
buy portfolio (all stocks assigned to portfolio 1 and 2 are called buy portfolio) minus the average 
stocks sizes in the sell portfolio (all stocks assigned to portfolio 5 and 6 are called sell portfolio) in 
order to match the BMS factor that calculated by using return of buy portfolio minus return of sell 
portfolio, PCT_down, which is the daily percentage of stocks which their prices are decreasing from 
day t to its previous day, RET_SP500 is the daily return on S&P 500 index, ln_VIX is the daily 
return of volatility index, DS is the daily default spread and TS is the daily term spread, and SI is 





Panel A  Spearman correlation 
 
BMS ln_CAP PCT_down RET_SP500 DS TS ln_VIX SI 
BMS 1 
       
ln_CAP -0.30*** 1 
      
PCT_down -0.29*** 0.42*** 1 
     
RET_SP500 0.24*** -0.12*** -0.82*** 1 
    
DS 0.24*** 0.06*** 0.10*** -0.02 1 
   
TS -0.14*** -0.28*** -0.03** -0.01 0.39*** 1 
  
ln_VIX -0.16*** 0.11*** 0.64*** -0.73*** -0.02 -0.02 1 
 





              
Panel B  Pearson Correlation 
 
BMS ln_CAP PCT_down RET_SP500 DS TS ln_VIX SI 
BMS 1 
       
ln_CAP -0.21*** 1 
      
PCT_down -0.31*** 0.42*** 1 
     
RET_SP500 0.30*** -0.17*** -0.79*** 1 
    
DS 0.29*** 0.03** 0.11*** -0.03* 1 
   
TS -0.15*** -0.28*** -0.01 -0.01 0.39*** 1 
  
ln_VIX -0.20*** 0.13*** 0.67*** -0.72*** -0.01 -0.01 
  












                                         Table VII 
Simple pooled OLS for explaining BMS factor 
 
This table reports different factor model estimates through the whole 18 years from 1993 to 2010 in order to 
examine the relation between BMS loading and those possible variables which may explain BMS. BMS is our 
created dependent variable. The other possible independent variables that may explain BMS are: 
BC, which is the daily business cycle index, ln_CAP, which is the natural logarithm of the absolute 
value of stock’s market capitalization which is calculated by using the average stocks’ market 
capitalizations in the buy portfolio (all stocks assigned to portfolio 1 and 2 are called buy portfolio) 
minus the average stocks sizes in the sell portfolio (all stocks assigned to portfolio 5 and 6 are 
called sell portfolio) in order to match the BMS factor that calculated by using return of buy 
portfolio minus return of sell portfolio, PCT_down, which is the daily percentage of stocks which 
their prices are decreasing from day t to its previous day, RET_SP500 is the daily return on S&P 
500 index, ln_VIX is the daily return of volatility index, DS is the daily default spread and TS is the 




Intercept BC ln_CAP PCT_down RET_SP500 DS TS ln_VIX SI 
Adj. R- 
Square 
          0.026  
       
0.006  0.117  
(191.367)  
       
(24.377)  
 0.027  





      
(-13.327)  
  0.029  





     
(-10.045)  
   0.019  
    
0.576  
   
0.084  
(46.905)  
    
(20.276)  
    0.027  
   
0.231  
    
0.085  
(198.160)  
   
(20.361)  
     0.036  
  
-0.020  





      0.100  -0.004  -0.004  -0.007  0.164  0.920  -0.229  0.011  0.005  0.401  
(28.360)  (-9.954)  (-20.643)  (-5.014)  (9.742)  (30.003)  (-20.088)  (3.777)  (20.417)  
 0.101  -0.004  -0.004  -0.006  0.142  0.916  -0.231  
 
0.005  0.399  
(28.950)  (-10.151)  (-21.457)  (-4.048)  (8.977)  (29.842)  (-20.196)   (20.485)    
          




                                          Table VIII 
Examination of BMS loadgings 
 
This table presents the average R-squares from year 1993 to 2010 by regressing the stock returns on different 
risk factors. The daily BMS factor is formed by taking the daily return difference between the “buy” 
portfolio, which includes stocks with the top 10% of buyer-initiated trades and the “sell” portfolio, which 
includes stocks with the top 10% of seller-initiated trades. Both the “buy” portfolio and “sell” portfolio have 
equal weights. The R-squares of six different regression models with and without BMS loading are used to 
examine whether our new BMS factor can improve the explanation of stock returns. The first set of 
comparison models are Model 1 which is the CAPM model and Model 2 which is the CAPM model by 
adding the BMS factor: 
 
              Rit −  Rrt = αiT + biTRMRFt + εit 
 Rit − Rrt = αiT + miTBMSt + biTRMRFt + εit 
 
Where Rit is the return of stock i; αiT is the estimated abnormal return of stock i each time period from 1 to 
T after adjusting these factors; BMS is factor we create; RMRF is the market return minus the risk free rate; 
SMB, HML, and UMD are the size factor, book-to-market factor and the momentum factor. Similarly, Model 
3 is the Fama-French 3-factor model and Model 4 is based on Model 3 by adding the BMS factor: 
 
              Rit −  Rrt = αiT + biTRMRFt + siTSMBt + hiTHMLt + εit 
              Rit − Rrt = αiT + miTBMSt + biTRMRFt + siTSMBt + hiTHMLt + εit 
 
Model 5 is the Carhart 4-factor model and Model 6 is the model based on Model 5 but adding the BMS 
loading: 
 
Rit − Rrt = αiT + biTRMRFt + siTSMBt + hiTHMLt + uiTUMDt + εit 





















1993 0.0284 0.0359 0.0534 0.0594 0.0610 0.0663 
1994 0.0414 0.0472 0.0628 0.0681 0.0689 0.0738 
1995 0.0292 0.0364 0.0527 0.0580 0.0589 0.0631 
1996 0.0419 0.0486 0.0696 0.0752 0.0767 0.0818 
1997 0.0590 0.0657 0.0869 0.0924 0.0930 0.0984 
1998 0.0810 0.0865 0.1137 0.1186 0.1215 0.1256 
1999 0.0335 0.0413 0.0617 0.0678 0.0688 0.0747 
2000 0.0668 0.0741 0.1015 0.1072 0.1104 0.1161 
2001 0.0899 0.0973 0.1243 0.1308 0.1380 0.1442 
2002 0.1215 0.1276 0.1498 0.1556 0.1638 0.1689 
2003 0.1143 0.1197 0.1418 0.1464 0.1489 0.1524 
2004 0.1220 0.1283 0.1534 0.1588 0.1600 0.1658 
2005 0.1225 0.1282 0.1519 0.1572 0.1606 0.1659 
2006 0.1462 0.1540 0.1739 0.1805 0.1851 0.1902 
2007 0.1993 0.2112 0.2281 0.2378 0.2426 0.2515 
2008 0.2987 0.3082 0.3387 0.3460 0.3482 0.3554 
2009 0.2946 0.2991 0.3195 0.3230 0.3291 0.3328 






Five-factor model estimates for size portfolio  
 
This table presents the estimated results for the five size-quintile portfolios. All the stocks are sorted into 5 groups 
according to their market capitalizations at the end of December in each year from 1993 to 2010. Q1 consists of 
stocks with the highest market size and Q5 contains stocks with the lowest market capitalization. For each 
size-quintile portfolio, the daily portfolio return is calculated by taking an equal-weighted average of all stocks in 
that portfolio. BMS is our created factor which formed by taking the daily return difference between the “buy” 
portfolio, which includes stocks with the top 10% of buyer-initiated trades and the “sell” portfolio, which 
includes stocks with the top 10% of seller-initiated trades. Both the “buy” portfolio and “sell” portfolio have 
equal weights. MKTRF is the market return minus the risk-free rate. SMB is the difference between the 
return of portfolio of small stocks and the return of portfolio of large stocks. HML is the difference between 
the return of a portfolio with high B/M stocks and the return of a portfolio with low B/M stocks. UMD is the 
difference between the return of a portfolio of stocks with high 30% of returns from t-12 to t-2 months before 
formation and the return of a portfolio of stocks with low 30% of returns during the same time period. The 
t-statistics are given in the parentheses. 
 
 
    BMS MKTRF SMB HML UMD _RSQ_ 
1993 Q1 0.023  1.037  0.392  0.036  0.083  0.974  
  
(1.091)  (67.206)  (23.647)  (1.986)  (5.338)  
 
 
Q2 -0.016  0.943  0.809  0.070  -0.020  0.957  
  
(-0.659)  (51.266)  (40.877)  (3.198)  (-1.084)  
 
 
Q3 -0.031  0.863  0.852  0.182  -0.079  0.900  
  
(-0.874)  (33.364)  (30.637)  (5.945)  (-3.040)  
 
 
Q4 0.033  0.699  0.819  0.260  -0.119  0.657  
  
(0.528)  (15.132)  (16.484)  (4.760)  (-2.570)  
 
 
Q5 -0.074  0.519  0.698  0.228  -0.044  0.324  
  
(-0.751)  (7.137)  (8.933)  (2.659)  (-0.602)  
 1994 Q1 0.042  1.043  0.373  0.082  0.080  0.986  
  
(2.443)  (90.414)  (25.625)  (4.144)  (4.682)  
 
 
Q2 0.003  1.004  0.833  0.197  -0.043  0.973  
  
(0.156)  (68.685)  (45.164)  (7.814)  (-1.968)  
 
 
Q3 -0.057  0.953  0.893  0.212  -0.158  0.872  
  
(-1.255)  (30.816)  (22.875)  (3.989)  (-3.453)  
 
 
Q4 -0.125  0.825  0.826  0.286  -0.211  0.768  
  
(-2.333)  (22.759)  (18.049)  (4.579)  (-3.926)  
 
 
Q5 -0.196  0.738  0.831  0.225  -0.356  0.537  
  
(-2.497)  (13.893)  (12.396)  (2.460)  (-4.527)  
 1995 Q1 0.061  1.115  0.446  0.146  0.023  0.965  
  
(2.466)  (59.133)  (22.319)  (5.348)  (1.077)  
 
 
Q2 0.050  1.045  0.870  0.212  -0.038  0.959  
  
(1.985)  (54.067)  (42.537)  (7.562)  (-1.697)  
 
 
Q3 0.062  0.911  0.760  0.103  -0.133  0.870  
  
(1.487)  (28.549)  (22.514)  (2.219)  (-3.634)  
 
 
Q4 0.022  0.736  0.637  0.082  -0.171  0.713  
  
(0.409)  (17.805)  (14.546)  (1.366)  (-3.620)  
 
 
Q5 -0.015  0.541  0.553  -0.032  -0.337  0.328  
  
(-0.160)  (7.365)  (7.107)  (-0.304)  (-4.003)  
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    BMS MKTRF SMB HML UMD _RSQ_ 
1996 Q1 0.037  1.029  0.430  0.069  -0.052  0.977  
  
(1.635)  (57.725)  (24.757)  (2.925)  (-2.656)  
 
 
Q2 0.044  1.009  0.867  0.170  -0.020  0.973  
  
(1.803)  (52.651)  (46.428)  (6.706)  (-0.964)  
 
 
Q3 0.004  0.962  0.915  0.214  -0.063  0.933  
  
(0.119)  (34.054)  (33.215)  (5.732)  (-2.042)  
 
 
Q4 -0.076  0.880  0.887  0.167  -0.144  0.849  
  
(-1.483)  (21.835)  (22.577)  (3.125)  (-3.262)  
 
 
Q5 -0.207  0.736  0.784  0.111  -0.177  0.557  
  
(-2.333)  (10.520)  (11.493)  (1.199)  (-2.309)  
 1997 Q1 0.059  1.043  0.529  0.169  -0.027  0.981  
  
(2.448)  (57.071)  (27.561)  (6.542)  (-1.059)  
 
 
Q2 0.078  0.997  0.878  0.206  -0.037  0.981  
  
(3.741)  (63.397)  (53.187)  (9.263)  (-1.696)  
 
 
Q3 0.009  0.925  0.856  0.267  -0.091  0.918  
  
(0.241)  (31.835)  (28.047)  (6.495)  (-2.280)  
 
 
Q4 -0.066  0.877  0.816  0.312  -0.142  0.806  
  
(-1.198)  (21.035)  (18.652)  (5.299)  (-2.475)  
 
 
Q5 -0.359  0.758  0.682  0.212  -0.254  0.516  
  
(-4.316)  (12.050)  (10.333)  (2.380) (-2.933)  
 1998 Q1 0.049  1.112  0.511  0.231  -0.104  0.981  
  
(2.882)  (66.569)  (24.615)  (7.014 ) (-4.652)  
 
 
Q2 0.048  1.040  0.896  0.291  -0.079  0.986  
  
(3.567)  (78.312)  (54.282)  (11.116)  (-4.475)  
 
 
Q3 0.020  0.906  0.825  0.356  -0.131  0.938  
  
(0.831)  (37.231)  (27.285)  (7.433)  (-4.041)  
 
 
Q4 -0.040  0.855  0.797  0.397  -0.144  0.871  
  
(-1.203)  (25.941)  (19.434)  (6.120)  (-3.260)  
 
 
Q5 -0.066  0.773  0.743  0.459  -0.290  0.735  
  
(-1.415)  (16.886)  (13.050)  (5.093)  (-4.729)  
 1999 Q1 0.118  1.183  0.584  0.391  -0.010  0.947  
  
(4.361)  (39.498)  (17.707)  (9.086)  (-0.367)  
 
 
Q2 0.119  0.997  0.873  0.472  -0.083  0.927  
  
(5.039)  (38.147)  (30.321)  (12.584)  (-3.379)  
 
 
Q3 0.065  0.763  0.691  0.353  -0.135  0.851  
  
(2.489)  (26.337)  (21.620)  (8.481)  (-4.951)  
 
 
Q4 -0.018  0.608  0.558  0.276  -0.148  0.603  
  
(-0.475)  (14.408)  (11.984)  (4.549)  (-3.741)  
 
 
Q5 -0.037  0.525  0.495  0.204  -0.210  0.446  
  
(-0.803)  (10.353)  (8.858)  (2.808)  (-4.409)  
 2000 Q1 0.132  1.112  0.445  0.321  -0.220  0.943  
  
(3.859)  (31.428)  (12.298)  (6.904)  (-9.159)  
 
 
Q2 0.100  0.957  0.826  0.233  -0.254  0.939  
  
(2.850)  (26.306)  (22.175)  (4.873)  (-10.276)  
 
 
Q3 0.042  0.770  0.780  0.251  -0.206  0.863  
  
(0.959)  (17.095)  (16.913)  (4.236)  (-6.732)  
 
 
Q4 -0.082  0.746  0.782  0.344  -0.174  0.748  
  
(-1.481)  (12.996)  (13.305)  (4.559)  (-4.460)  
 
 
Q5 -0.146  0.781  0.965  0.408  -0.177  0.583  
  
(-1.645)  (8.520)  (10.281)  (3.386)  (-2.837)  
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    BMS MKTRF SMB HML UMD _RSQ_ 
2001 Q1 -0.009  1.099  0.445  0.228  -0.042  0.968  
  
(-0.404)  (55.311)  (14.397)  (6.414)  (-2.000)  
 
 
Q2 0.051  0.986  0.949  0.363  -0.110  0.970  
  
(2.594)  (53.670)  (33.211)  (11.050)  (-5.709)  
 
 
Q3 0.059  0.676  0.691  0.381  -0.204  0.888  
  
(1.980)  (24.492)  (16.095)  (7.715)  (-7.046)  
 
 
Q4 0.056  0.456  0.491  0.416  -0.312  0.745  
  
(1.436)  (12.573)  (8.712)  (6.410)  (-8.202)  
 
 
Q5 0.141  0.327  0.429  0.446  -0.427  0.620  
  
(2.707)  (6.720)  (5.674)  (5.134)  (-8.383)  
 2002 Q1 0.087  0.995  0.302  0.260  -0.033  0.982  
  
(2.901)  (60.820)  (13.578)  (10.167)  (-1.984)  
 
 
Q2 0.057  0.936  0.819  0.336  -0.106  0.989  
  
(2.707)  (81.053)  (52.240)  (18.659)  (-9.124)  
 
 
Q3 -0.023  0.706  0.649  0.417  -0.169  0.960  
  
(-0.731)  (41.096)  (27.828)  (15.562)  (-9.738)  
 
 
Q4 -0.083  0.424  0.351  0.397  -0.234  0.780  
  
(-1.539)  (14.329)  (8.720)  (8.590)  (-7.812)  
 
 
Q5 -0.088  0.352  0.238  0.464  -0.303  0.573  
  
(-1.051)  (7.735)  (3.845)  (6.532)  (-6.583)  
 2003 Q1 0.016  0.986  0.286  0.188  -0.096  0.978  
  
(0.513)  (73.782)  (13.956)  (5.774)  (-5.293)  
 
 
Q2 0.050  0.972  0.819  0.307  -0.089  0.990  
  
(2.259)  (104.461)  (57.460)  (13.569)  (-7.026)  
 
 
Q3 -0.003  0.814  0.795  0.349  -0.087  0.966  
  
(-0.088)  (56.246)  (35.859)  (9.907)  (-4.433)  
 
 
Q4 0.042  0.422  0.456  0.290  -0.132  0.782  
  
(0.802)  (19.129)  (13.498)  (5.406)  (-4.408)  
 
 
Q5 0.091  0.284  0.335  0.265  -0.131  0.495  
  
(1.241)  (9.340)  (7.185)  (3.582)  (-3.160)  
 2004 Q1 -0.008  0.991  0.246  0.143  0.028  0.977  
  
(-0.274)  (62.138)  (12.120)  (5.330)  (1.391)  
 
 
Q2 -0.030  1.007  0.806  0.231  -0.094  0.988  
  
(-1.113)  (70.606)  (44.339)  (9.629)  (-5.167)  
 
 
Q3 -0.151  0.903  0.807  0.145  -0.021  0.969  
  
(-3.811)  (42.381)  (29.720)  (4.045)  (-0.791)  
 
 
Q4 -0.234  0.591  0.417  0.199  0.064  0.781  
  
(-3.322)  (15.623)  (8.641)  (3.129)  (1.323)  
 
 
Q5 -0.133  0.434  0.341  0.213  0.100  0.561  
  
(-1.412)  (8.550)  (5.264)  (2.487)  (1.539)  
 2005 Q1 0.000  0.980  0.249  0.121  0.069  0.982  
  
(-0.017)  (66.743)  (13.723)  (4.009)  (3.671)  
 
 
Q2 -0.025  1.019  0.757  0.166  -0.022  0.992  
  
(-1.126)  (87.660)  (52.661)  (6.951)  (-1.466)  
 
 
Q3 -0.108  0.868  0.754  0.136  -0.053  0.967  
  
(-2.646)  (41.285)  (28.979)  (3.147)  (-1.970)  
 
 
Q4 -0.331  0.513  0.345  0.089  0.017  0.759  
  
(-5.348)  (16.100)  (8.760)  (1.363)  (0.412)  
 
 
Q5 -0.528  0.460  0.251  0.110  0.017  0.494  
  
(-6.222)  (10.517)  (4.635)  (1.229)  (0.304)  
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    BMS MKTRF SMB HML UMD _RSQ_ 
2006 Q1 -0.004  0.979  0.238  0.038  0.086  0.985  
  
(-0.153)  (60.470)  (13.035)  (1.279)  (4.924)  
 
 
Q2 -0.036  1.030  0.724  0.119  -0.044  0.993  
  
(-1.694)  (80.188)  (49.890)  (5.022)  (-3.153)  
 
 
Q3 -0.141  0.913  0.785  0.127  -0.059  0.980  
  
(-4.128)  (44.045)  (33.547)  (3.316)  (-2.638)  
 
 
Q4 -0.227  0.442  0.409  0.056  0.183  0.808  
  
(-3.585)  (11.496)  (9.419)  (0.796)  (4.432)  
 
 
Q5 -0.305  0.304  0.250  -0.012  0.237  0.597  
  
(-3.996)  (6.585)  (4.801)  (-0.141)  (4.765)  
 2007 Q1 -0.037  1.032  0.201  0.108  0.085  0.987  
  
(-1.988)  (115.552)  (9.663)  (3.618)  (5.656)  
 
 
Q2 -0.014  1.054  0.761  0.165  0.004  0.993  
  
(-0.946)  (146.341)  (45.319)  (6.888)  (0.306)  
 
 
Q3 -0.058  0.974  0.808  0.178  -0.009  0.975  
  
(-2.215)  (77.443)  (27.544)  (4.260)  (-0.438)  
 
 
Q4 -0.333  0.617  0.384  0.062  0.045  0.803  
  
(-7.259)  (28.102)  (7.505)  (0.850)  (1.231)  
 
 
Q5 -0.457  0.501  0.188  -0.004  0.055  0.649  
  
(-8.795)  (20.151)  (3.249)  (-0.044)  (1.316)  
 2008 Q1 0.022  1.045  0.205  -0.050  -0.085  0.993  
  
(1.604)  (122.959)  (12.041)  (-2.471)  (-6.235)  
 
 
Q2 0.016  1.033  0.662  0.039  -0.118  0.991  
  
(1.007 ) (103.577)  (33.136)  (1.637)  (-7.355)  
 
 
Q3 -0.070  0.989  0.635  0.043  -0.082  0.966  
  
(-2.431)  (55.642)  (17.852)  (1.024)  (-2.879)  
 
 
Q4 -0.219  0.664  0.283  -0.020  -0.139  0.848  
  
(-5.095)  (25.044)  (5.330)  (-0.317)  (-3.260)  
 
 
Q5 -0.284  0.484  0.070  -0.038  -0.189  0.676  
  
(-5.252)  (14.537)  (1.048)  (-0.473)  (-3.527)  
 2009 Q1 0.025  1.045  0.194  -0.009  -0.109  0.993  
  
(1.748)  (86.907)  (10.641)  (-0.487)  (-10.585)  
 
 
Q2 0.045  1.024  0.644  0.062  -0.129  0.992  
  
(2.873)  (77.477)  (32.149)  (3.069)  (-11.431)  
 
 
Q3 0.048  0.970  0.718  0.006  -0.150  0.977  
  
(1.803)  (42.961)  (20.974)  (0.186)  (-7.773)  
 
 
Q4 0.063  0.643  0.473  -0.004  -0.173  0.923  
  
(1.771)  (21.237)  (10.298)  (-0.081)  (-6.694)  
 
 
Q5 0.096  0.264  0.199  -0.006  -0.251  0.715  
  
(1.931)  (6.264)  (3.115)  (-0.100)  (-6.973)  
 2010 Q1 0.045  0.991  0.132  0.058  0.108  0.993  
  
(1.944)  (99.838)  (9.099)  (3.014)  (6.736)  
 
 
Q2 0.024  0.952  0.647  0.126  0.006  0.996  
  
(1.293)  (118.696)  (55.340)  (8.182)  (0.437)  
 
 
Q3 -0.025  0.889  0.736  0.185  -0.071  0.986  
  
(-0.722)  (59.603)  (33.832)  (6.458)  (-2.946)  
 
 
Q4 -0.185  0.649  0.487  0.186  0.018  0.941  
  
(-3.562)  (28.833)  (14.816)  (4.301)  (0.505)  
 
 
Q5 -0.164  0.330  0.207  0.229  0.048  0.725  
   (-2.304)  (10.743)  (4.609)  (3.862)  (0.971)    
 
 
